DONALD E. CAMPBELL JAN., 2000
Office Address: Department of Economics
College of William and Mary
Williamsburg, VA 23l87-8795
Home Address: 114 Pasbehegh Drive
Williamsburg, VA 23185
Personal: Born January 13, 1943
Canadian Citizen; Permanent resident of the USA
Married to Diane L. Campbell (two children)
Degrees: Honors B.A. (Economics), Queen's University,
Ph.D. (Economics), Princeton University, 1972
Current Academic Positions:
CSX Professor of Economics and Public Policy,
Department of Economics, College of William and Mary: 1990 -
The Center for Economic Design, Bogazici University, Turkey: 1995-
Past Academic Positions:
University of Toronto, Department of Economics,
and Scarborough College (Division of Social Sciences)
1970-1974 Assistant Professor
1975-1980 Associate Professor
Visiting Scholar, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University: 1974-1975
Visiting Professor, U.E.R. Scientifique de Luminy, France: Summer, 1978
Visiting Fellow, Nuffield College, Oxford University: April, 1979
Visiting Professor, Bar-Ilan University, Israel: May, 1986
Visiting Professor, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel: November, 1994
Visiting Professor, The University of Arizona: January - April, 1995
Visiting Professor, Université de Caen, Caen, France: May and June, 1995
Scholar in Residence, Villa Serbelloni (Rockefeller Foundation), Bellagio, Italy:
Visiting Professor, Université de Caen, Caen, France: May, 1996
Visiting Professor, Université de Rennes I, Rennes, France: May, 1996
1972-1974 Assistant Chair, Division of Social Sciences,
Scarborough College, University of Toronto
1986-1987 Assistant Chair, Division of Social Sciences (i.e., Head of Economics.), Scarborough College, University of Toronto.
Social Choice and Welfare (Associate Editor).
Review of Economic Design (Associate Editor).
June 1990 - May 1992:
National Science Foundation, grant no. SES 9007953:
Social Choice in Economic Environments.
Oct. 1992 - Sept. 1994:
National Science Foundation, grant no. SES 9209039:
Nonbinary Social Choice.
Dec. 1994 Rockefeller Foundation: Summer 1995 residence at the Bellagio Study and Conference Center (Bellagio, Lago di Como, Italy) to work with Jerry Kelly on Trade-Off Theory.
1987 Resource Allocation Mechanisms. New York: Cambridge University Press.
1992 Equity, Efficiency, and Social Choice. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
1995 Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information. Cambridge University Press.
ARTICLES IN REFEREED JOURNALS
1973 Social Choice and Intensity of Preference. Journal of Political Economy 81: 211-218.
1975 Voting Equilibrium in a Simple Tax Model. Journal of Economic Theory 11:147-154.
1975 Income Distribution under Majority Rule and Alternative Taxation Criteria. Public Choice.
1976 Democratic Preference Functions. Journal of Economic Theory 12: 259-272.
1977 Computational Criteria for Voting Systems. British Journal of Political Science 7: 85-98.
1978 Rationality from a Computational Standpoint. Theory and Decision 9: 255-266.
1979 Realization of Choice Functions. Econometrica 46: 171-180.
1979 Manipulation of Social Choice Rules by Strategic Nomination of Candidates. Theory and Decision 10: 247-263.
1980 Algorithms for Social Choice Functions. Review of Economic Studies 47: 617-628.
1980 Anonymity in Social Choice Theory (with Peter Fishburn). Theory and Decision 12: 21-39.
1981 Some Strategic Properties of Majority Rule and Plurality Rule. Theory and Decision 13: 93-107.
1982 On the Derivation of Majority Rule. Theory and Decision 14: 133-140.
1984 Enforcement of Resource Allocation Mechanisms and Second Best Industrial Policy. Journal of Economic Theory 34: 319-341.
1985 Impossibility Theorems and Infinite Horizon Planning. Social Choice and Welfare 2: 283-293.
1986 Revealed Preference and Demand Correspondences. Journal of Economic Theory 38: 364-370.
1986 Social Compromise and Social Metrics. (With S. Nitzan) Social Choice and Welfare 3: 1-16.
1987 Revealed Social Preference. Social Choice and Welfare 4: 225-234.
1988 A Generalization of the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics for Nonconvex Economies. International Economic Review 29: 201-215.
1988 Boundary Optima in the Theory of Public Goods Supply. (With M. Truchon)
Journal of Public Economics 35: 241-249.
1988 Redistribution of Wealth when Knowledge is Dispersed. Social Choice and Welfare 5: 1-6.
1988 A Characterization of Simple Majority Rule for Restricted Domains. Economics Letters 28: 307-310.
1989 Wilson's Theorem for Economic Environments and Continuous Social Preferences. Social Choice and Welfare 6: 315-323.
1989 Arrow's Theorem for Economic Environments and Effective Social Preferences. Social Choice and Welfare 6: 325-329.
1989 Equilibrium and Efficiency with Property Rights and Local Consumption Externalities. Social Choice and Welfare 6: 189-203.
1990 Intergenerational Social Choice without the Pareto Principle. Journal of Economic Theory 50: 414-423.
1990 Can Equity be Purchased at the Expense of Efficiency? An Axiomatic Inquiry. Journal of Economic Theory 51: 32-47.
1990 Maximal Elements of Weakly Continuous Relations. (With Mark Walker). Journal of Economic Theory 50: 459-464.
1992 Quasitransitive Intergenerational Social Choice for Economic Environments. Journal of Mathematical Economics 21: 229-247.
1992 Transitive Social Choice in Economic Environments. International Economic Review 33: 341-352.
1992 Implementation of Social Welfare Functions. International Economic Review 33: 525-533.
1992 Public Goods and Arrovian Social Choice. Social Choice and Welfare 9: 173-184.
1992 The Arrow and Plott independence conditions. Economics Letters 39: 143-146.
1993 Euclidean Individual preferences and Continuous Social Preferences. European Journal of Political Economy 9:541-550.
1993 t or 1--t ? That is the Trade-off. (With Jerry Kelly). Econometrica 61: 1355-1365.
1994 A Foundation for Pareto Optimality in Spatial Models. European Journal of Political Economy 10: 441-448.
1994 A Foundation for Pareto Aggregation (With Ryo-ichi Nagahisa). Journal of Economic Theory 64:277-285.
1994 Trade-Off Theory. (With Jerry Kelly.) American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 84: 422-426.
1994 Arrow's choice axiom. Economics Letters 44: 381-384.
1994 A Power Structure Version of Sen's Paretian Liberal Theorem. Seoul Economic Journal 7: 269-278.
1995 Nonbinary Social Choice for Economic Environments. Social Choice and Welfare 12:245-254.
1995 Lebesgue Measure and Social Choice Trade-Offs. (With Jerry Kelly). Economic Theory 5: 445-459.
1995 Asymptotic Density and Social Choice Trade-Offs. (With Jerry Kelly). Mathematical Social Sciences 29:181-194
1995 Nondictatorially Independent Pairs. (With Jerry Kelly). Social Choice and Welfare 12: 75-86.
1995 Arrow's Theorem for Economic Domains and Edgeworth Hyperboxes. (With Georges Bordes and Michel Le Breton). International Economic Review 36: 441-454.
1996 Continuous-Valued Social Choice. (With Jerry Kelly). Journal of Mathematical Economics 25: 195-211.
1996 Social Choice Trade-Offs for an Arbitrary Measure: With Application to Uncertain or Fuzzy Agenda. (With Jerry Kelly). Economics Letters 50: 90-104.
1996 Social Choice Trade-Offs in the Spatial Model of Resource Allocation. (With Jerry Kelly) Journal of Public Economics 60: 1-19.
1996 Independent social choice correspondences. (With Jerry Kelly). Theory and Decision 41: 1-11.
1996 Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences. (With Jerry Kelly). International Economic Review 37: 803-824.
1997 Relaxing Pareto Optimality in Economic Environments. (With Jerry Kelly.) Economic Theory 10 (no. 1): 115-130.
1997 Sen's Theorem and Externalities. (With Jerry Kelly.) Economica 64: 375-386.
1997 Preference Aggregation. (With Jerry Kelly). Mathematica Japonica vol. 45, no. 3: 573-593.
1998 Incompatibility of Strategy-Proofness and the Condorcet Principle. (With Jerry Kelly). Social Choice and Welfare 15: 583-592.
1998 Quasitransitive Social Preference: Why Some Large Coalitions Have Very Little Power. (With Jerry Kelly). Economic Theory 12: 147-162.
1999 Trade-offs for democratic preference revelation. (With Jerry Kelly). Journal of Public Economic Theory 1: 465-474.
1999 Weak independence and veto power. (With Jerry Kelly). Economics Letters, forthcoming.
2000 Information and preference aggregation. (With Jerry Kelly). Social Choice and Welfare 17: 85-93.
2000 A simple characterization of majority rule. (With Jerry Kelly). Economic Theory, forthcoming.
2000 Trade-Offs for the Preference Revelation Problem. (With Jerry Kelly). Journal of Mathematical Economics, forthcoming.
1970 Voting and Social Choice. American Economist 24: 35-44.
1996 Sharper Impossibility Theorems for Economic Environments. In Social Choice and Political Economy, N. Schofield, ed. Boston: Kluwer Pub. Co. pp. 63 - 78.
1997 The Possibility-Impossibility Boundary in Social Choice. (With Jerry Kelly). In The Theory of Social Choice, Proceedings of the 1994 International Economic Association conference at Schloss Hernstein, Austria. K.J. Arrow, A.K. Sen, and K. Suzumura eds. London: Macmillan.
2000 Impossibility Theorems in the Arrovian Framework. (With Jerry Kelly) In Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, K.J. Arrow, A.K. Sen, and K. Suzumura eds. North-Holland, forthcoming.
2000 Public Goods, in the Encyclopaedia of Life Support Systems, UNESCO, forthcoming.
Continuous-Valued Social Choice in Economic Environments. (With Jerry Kelly.) Mathematical Social Sciences.
New trade-off results: transitivity and free triples. (With Jerry Kelly). Submitted to Social Choice and Welfare.
Organ Transplants, Fields Medals, and Early Rounds of the Kappel Piano Competition. (With Jerry Kelly)
How strategy-proof is majority rule? (With Jerry Kelly)
Characterizing strategy-proofness for non-resolute social choice procedures. (With Jerry Kelly) Submitted to Economic Theory.
BOOKS IN PROGRESS
Mathematics for Economists, with Alfredo Pereira. (Under contract to Prentice-Hall).
Microeconomics: A Calculus-Based Approach to Intermediate Price Theory, with Alfredo Pereira. (Under contract to Prentice-Hall).
Strategic Preference Revelation When More Than One Alternative Is Selected, with Jerry Kelly. (We've received a signed contract from Kluwer, but have not yet signed it ourselves.)