Publications: 1990 - 2000

1990 Intergenerational Social Choice without the Pareto Principle. Journal of Economic Theory 50: 414-423.

1990 Can Equity be Purchased at the Expense of Efficiency? An Axiomatic Inquiry. Journal of Economic Theory 51: 32-47.

1990 Maximal Elements of Weakly Continuous Relations. (With Mark Walker). Journal of Economic Theory 50: 459-464.

1992 Equity, Efficiency, and Social Choice. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

1992 Quasitransitive Intergenerational Social Choice for Economic Environments. Journal of Mathematical Economics 21: 229-247.

1992 Transitive Social Choice in Economic Environments. International Economic Review 33: 341-352.

1992 Implementation of Social Welfare Functions. International Economic Review 33: 525-533.

1992 Public Goods and Arrovian Social Choice. Social Choice and Welfare 9: 173-184.

1992 The Arrow and Plott independence conditions. Economics Letters 39: 143-146.

1993 Euclidean Individual preferences and Continuous Social Preferences. European Journal of Political Economy 9:541-550.

1994 A Foundation for Pareto Optimality in Spatial Models. European Journal of Political Economy 10: 441-448.

1994 A Simple Foundation for Pareto Optimality. (With Ryo-ichi Nagahisa). Journal of Economic Theory 64:277-285.

1994 Trade-Off Theory. (With Jerry Kelly.) American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 84: 422-426.

1994 Arrow's choice axiom. Economics Letters 44: 381-384.

1994 A Power Structure Version of Sen's Paretian Liberal Theorem. Seoul Economic Journal 7: 269-278.

1995 Nonbinary Social Choice for Economic Environments. Social Choice and Welfare 12:245-254.

1995 Asymptotic Density and Social Choice Trade-Offs. (With Jerry Kelly). Mathematical Social Sciences 29:181-194

1995 Nondictatorially Independent Pairs. (With Jerry Kelly). Social Choice and Welfare 12: 75-86.

1996 Social Choice Trade-Offs for an Arbitrary Measure: With Application to Uncertain or Fuzzy Agenda. (With Jerry Kelly). Economics Letters 50: 90-104.

1996 Social Choice Trade-Offs in the Spatial Model of Resource Allocation. (With Jerry Kelly) Journal of Public Economics 60: 1-19.

1996 Independent social choice correspondences. (With Jerry Kelly). Theory and Decision 41: 1-11.

1996 Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences. (With Jerry Kelly). International Economic Review 37: 803-824.

1997 Sen's Theorem and Externalities. (With Jerry Kelly.) Economica, 64: 375-386.

1997 Relaxing Pareto Optimality in Economic Environments. (With Jerry Kelly.) Economic Theory 10, (no. 1): 115-130.

1997 Preference Aggregation. (With Jerry Kelly). Mathematica Japonica vol. 45, no. 3: 573-593.

1998 Incompatibility of Strategy-Proofness and the Condorcet Principle. (With Jerry Kelly). Social Choice and Welfare 15: 583-592.

1998 Quasitransitive Social Preference: Why Some Large Coalitions Have Very Little Power. (With Jerry Kelly). Economic Theory 12: 147-162.

1999 Trade-offs for democratic preference revelation. (With Jerry Kelly). Journal of Public Economic Theory 1: 465-474.

1999 Weak independence and veto power. (With Jerry Kelly). Economics Letters, forthcoming.

2000 Information and preference aggregation. (With Jerry Kelly). Social Choice and Welfare 17: 85-93.

2000 A simple characterization of majority rule. (With Jerry Kelly). Economic Theory, forthcoming.

2000 Trade-Offs for the Preference Revelation Problem. (With Jerry Kelly). Journal of Mathematical Economics, forthcoming.

2000 Impossibility Theorems in the Arrovian Framework. (With Jerry Kelly) In Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, K.J. Arrow, A.K. Sen, and K. Suzumura eds. North-Holland, forthcoming.

2000 Public Goods, in the Encyclopaedia of Life Support Systems, UNESCO, forthcoming.